MARTIN vs. WATER POWER COMPANY.

into casuales, votestativw and mixtce. The first of these comprehend conditions whose fulfilment depends solely on chance or the
operation of natural laws, or the will of a third person ; the second,
conditions whose performance depends solely on the will of the
creditor or party to be benefited; and the third, by its name, denotes conditions where fulfilment or performance depends partly on
one and partly on the other2

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

United States Circuit Courtfor the -Districtof New Jersey.
JOHN M. MARTIN vs. THE SOMERVILLE WATER POWER COMPANY AND
OTHERS.

1. The present constitution of New Jersey limits the powers of the legislature, and
separates them from those of the judiciary, and adopts the prohibitions of the
constitution of the United States against laws impairing the obligations of contracts, and further prohibits the depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a
contract which existed when the contract was made. Hence,
2. Where the legislature passed an act for the relief of the creditors of a manufacturing corporation, providing that certain persons should be authorized to sell all
property mortgaged for the payment of bonds, at public sale to the highest bidder,freefrom all incumbrances, and after paying certain expenses and costs, to
distribute the proceeds to the corporation's creditors according to the priorities of
their several liens, it was held that such legislation was unconstitutional by reason of its impairing the obligation of the contract between the mortgagors and
the mortgagees, and depriving the mortgagees of a remedy which existed at the
time the contract was made.

In this case the constitutionality of certain acts of the legislature

of New Jersey, which authorized the sale of the property of the
company free and clear of all prior incumbrancis, was argued at
the last term of the court held at Trenton by S. B. Ransom, Esq.,
I Muhlenbrdch Doct. Pand. vol. I, J 100 ; Mackeldey, 1 179 ; Lindley's Introd.
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and the complainant in person, for the complainant, and by the
Ron. William Z. .Dayton and A. 0. Zahriie,.Ea ., for the defendants.
In 1848, the Somerville Water Power Company, incorporated by
the legislature of New Jersey, being indebted in the sum of
$50,000 to certain creditors in New York and Connecticut fo"
moneys advanced to the company, issued one hundred negotiable
bonds for $500 each, payable in 1853, with interest, andsdelivergd c,
ninety-six of them to such creditors in part payment of "the company's indebtedness.
To secure the payment of these bonds, the company mortgaged
all its real estate, franchises, water power, and property at Somerville to the present chancellor and two other well known gentlemeii
of New Jersey, as trustees for the holders;of the bonds.
Many of these bonds were sold in the New. York market, and the
complainant became the owner of a part of them, for value. In the
meanwhile, the -company having become embarrassed, transferred'
and merged itself into another corporation of New Jersey, called
the Hudson Manufacturing Company, 'and the trustees transferred
the mortgage to the last company, subject to the rights of the honI
holders under it.
At length both companies became so embarrassed, -and their-pro:
perty so encumbered by judgments, decrees, sheriffs' sales and iMjunctions, that it was deemed almost impossible to make .a- title'
thereto, by means of regular legal proceedings in the State courts,.
and the legislature was resorted to for aid.,
. Accordingly, an act was'passed.in the winter of 1856 "'to relibve
the creditors and stockholders of the Somerville Water Po~wer Company and of the Hudson Manufacturing Company," and also a supplementary act, by which certain persons therein named were
authorized to sell the whole of the morigaged property at -ppblic
sale, to the highest bidder, free from all incumbrancee8 and after
*payingexpenses and certain costs, to distribute the proceeds amongst
the creditors, according to the priorities of their several liens. In
May following, the property, -which had been valued at $150,0006,
was knocked down at $50,000.
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In this stage of the proceedings, the complainant, knowing that
the sum for which the property was sold would not pay the amount
pecured by the mortgage and interest, and believing that the pro'porty.at a fsir sale under a decree of foreclosure would sell for
-Iee than enough f'or that purpose, filed his bill in the federal
court for the foreclosure of the $50,000 mortgage, Und praying {hat
the acts in question be decreed unconstitutional and void, on the
ground tlat they were in violation of the obligation of the contract
'between the bondholders and the Somerville Water Company, and
repugnant to the constitutions of the United States and of the State
-,of New Jersey.
The question came up on -demurrer to the complainant's bill, and
' was decided for the -complainant, the court holding the acts unconstitutional and void, and granting a perpetual injunction against all
.proeeedings under them.

-Tihe -opinion of the court -was delivered by
S..E , J.-The demurrer to the bill in this case has been entered
, for the purpose of having a final hearing and judgment of the court
en the validity of the act of the legislature of New Jersey, author-

!zing the receiver to sell the premises in question free and discharged
from the lien and-estate of the mortgagees.

It is contended that this legislation is forbidden both by the conS .titution of the State and that of the United States.
.
*

-'

-

Previous to the 29th of June, 1844, the State of New Jersey was

gzoverned by the old colonial constitution, adopted on the 2d of July,
1776. This contained no bill of rights nor any clear limitation of
the powers of the legislature. The history of New Jersey legislation
exib its a long list of private acts and anomalous legislation on the
aftirs 'of individuals, assuiming control over wills, deeds, partitions,
trusts, ad other subjects usually coming under the jurisdiction of
"caurtsof aaw or equity; .consequently the decisions of the courts of
.9ew Jersey of questions arising under the old constitution cannot
be cited as precedents applicable to the present one, which carefully
defines and limits the powers entrusted to the legislature, the execu-
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tive, and the judiciary. It is very desirable that -the constitution
of a State should be construed by its own tribunals, andl we regret
that the researches of counsel have not furnished us with such precedents. The case of Potts vs. The Delaware Water Power Company,
1 Stockton, 592, has reference to an act passed before the adoption
of the present constitution. That act was declared by the court
"not to impair the obligation of any contract," and to be remedial
only. The first mortgagees gave their assent to the sales made
under it, and others could not object to it as made without their
authority. In this important respect it differs from the present
case, and cannot be relied on as a preceaent.
The validity of this act has been challenged on several grounds.
If'found invalid on any one, we need not examine the others.
The constitution of New Jersey has not only carefully limited the
powers of the legislature, and separated them from those of the
judiciary, but it adopts the prohibitions of the Constitution of the
United States against ez post facto -laws, and laws impairing the
obligations of contracts, and with this addition, "or depriving a
party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when
the contract was made."
It is not contended that the dct comes under the category of an
"ex post facto law ;" and if it be merely remedial in its character,
as defendants contend, there can be no valid objection to it under
this hea:d of the constitution.
Does it impair the obligation of the contract between the mortgagees and mortgagors, or deprive the mortgagees of any remedy
which existed when the contract was made?
The act and supplement must be construed together as forming
one act. It'is entitled "An Act to relieve the creditors and stockholders of the Somerville Water Power Company," &c.' It sets
forth in its preamble certain representations made, no doubt, by
those who procured the act, showing plausible reasons for such legislative interference. But the validity of the act must be judged
from its actual operation on the rights of parties subjected to it, and
not by the pretences put forth by the preamble. This may show
that the legislature acted in good faith, and believing that their in-
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terference would wrong no one, but not that such was the actual
result. Legislators cannot be too cautious when asked to interfere
by special legislation for particular persons or particular cases, on
exparte representations. They cannot call all parties before them
and judge upon a full hearing-this is for the courts. Their action
may not always be unjust, but it may and often is tyrannical and
injurious.
Let us inquire what is the contract, and how is it affected by this
act ?
The mortgagees of this property held the legal title in trust for
the several bondholders who may properly be treated as the real
mortgagees. They may be said, in common parlance, to have a
"lien" or "security" on the property mortgaged, but they have it
by force of their legal title to the property. It is an estate in fee
simple, defeasible only by payment of the debt. When the condition of the obligation is broken, the mortgagees may enter on the
premises and recover the rents, issues, and profits thereof, till their
debt is satisfied. If they see fit, they may appoint an agent or
attorney, who may enter on the land under their direction and make
sale of the same in satisfaction of the debt. The disposal of the
mortgaged premises is to be made according to the discretion and
judgment of the mortgagees, and not of another. No subsequent
incumbrancer or assignee of the equity of redemption can divest
their estate contrary to their will, unless by a tender of the debt
due. They cannot be compelled, to suit the convenience of others,
to put up the property to sale, at a time or in a manner which might
lessen or injure their security.
Now, by this contract the estate of the mortgagees is defeasible
only by payment of the debt. But this act permits the receiver to
dispose of their estate, and does not provide that the debt shall be
first fully paid. It permits the receiver to sell for any sum, whether
it be sufficient for such purpose or not, and the receiver has made
a contract of sale for a sum insufficient by many thousands of dollars. This is making a new contract for the parties and impairing
the obligation of the mortgage. It may be truly said " 'tis not so
written in the bond." The mortgagees may dispose of their secu-
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ity for less than the amount of their debt, but no other person
3an.
2d. The obligation of this contract is moreover impaired by this
act, in that it gives a precedence to certain indefinite costs and
charges, (not costs of the sale merely,) to be paid out of the proceeds of the property before the mortgage debt. This is in direct
contravention of the contract by which the estate was conveyed to
the mortgagees, free from all charges and incumbrances.
3d. The mortgagees had by their contract a remedy, to be used
at their own option and discretion, as to time and mode of sale ; and
by law, they had the remedy of entry on the premises, and receiving the rents and profits. This act deprives them of both, contrary
to the letter of the constitution of New Jersey, without invoking the
aid of the cases of Bronson agt. Kinzie, 1 Howard, 311, and
lcCracken agt. Raywood, 2 Howard, 611.
We have not thought it necessary to review the very numerous
cases on the subject, or to attempt any metaphysical definition of
what constitutes "1the obligation of a contract," as it is clear that
any legislation which defeats the estate of the mortgagee without
payment or tender of the whole debt due on the bonds, which gives
a preference to posterior liens, and which deprives the mortgagee of
his remedy given by the covenants of his contract, as also that given
by the law of the land, "impairs its obligation," and is contrary to
the letter and spirit of the constitution of New Jersey. This act
may be remedial as to the owners of the equity of redemption and
those having liens against it, but the mortgagees have a right to say,
non in lzaec foedera veni. We have never agreed to have our estate defeated to suit the convenience of others.
The complainant is entitled to a deeree making the injunction
perpetual-but the defendants have leave to answer as to the other
charges of the bill.

-iM .

TUNNO vs. THE BETSINA.

In the United Stat'e Court, in Admiralty, South Carofina istrit.
TUNNO ET AL. VS. THE BETSINA.
1!' A distenting part owner is entitled to a stipulation to'secure his interest in case
ora lss on a voyage undertaken against his 'wishes.
2. The court of admiralty 'will not order -an account as a separate and independent
mode of relief, but only as incident to other matter of which it has admitted cognizance.
3. In the management of a vessel the opinion of the majority shall prevail, unless
it forbids its employment, in 'which case it yields to the minority, 'who desire its
employment, because the public interest- must be protected in securing employment to the vessel.
4. The court of admiralty has an admitted jurisdiction to secure the value of the
dissentient minority's interest, in case of disagreement among part owners in the
employment of the vessel.
5. The foreign authorities with regard to the employment and sale of a vessel in
case of disagreement among joint owners, collected and commented on.

Libel for stipulation, account, and sale.

'Petqruf- King; Proctors for libellants.
Brown & Porter,Proctors for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MAGRATH, J.-The libel in this case asks the aid of the court in
three modes of relief: first, in a stipulation from the other part
owners for the return of the vessel; second, in having an account
taken of her earnings; third, in a decree for sale, upon two grounds:
1st, an irreconcilable disagreement among the owners, as to the
mode in which the vessel should be employed; 2dly, misrepresentation in inducing the libellant to become the purchaser of the shares
now owned by him in this vessel.
The application for the stipulation, intended to secure the interest
of a dissenting part owner, in case of a loss in a voyage undertaken
against his wishes, has now become a familiar subject for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. He who is unwilling that a vessel
shall proceed on a given voyage, may give notice thereof to his coowners; and in case of loss he cannot be made liable to contribute,
Abbott, 125, or he may apply to this court, and will be entitled to"
a stipulation, by which, in the event of loss, they shall be bound to
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him for the value of his share, Id. So much of the prayer in the
libel as relates to the stipulation has therefore been granted. It
may not be improper for me to say, that the stipulation, in such
matters, is in its nature provisional. It is not treated nor allowed
as a continuing, permanent arrangement, by which the rights of an
owner are protected and preserved; but simply as a present measure of relief, afforded in a particular case, for a particular voyage.
And when the application for it is regularly made, it then is apparent that a fixed discordance has arisen between the owners,
which would seem to call for the exercise of some relief to be adopted,
either by them or for them, more perfect and enduring.
In relation to the account which is prayed for, it is, in this branch
of the case, sufficient for me to say, that considered in itself as a
separate and independent mode of relief, it cannot be obtained in
the admiralty. Steamboat Orleans vs. Phaxbus, 11 Pet. 175; Minturn vs. M)faynard, 17 How. 477. An account will be ordered as
an incident of other matters concerning which the court has admitted cognizance. Davis vs. Child, Davei's Rep. 71. In this case,
therefore, the question for an account depends on another question
involving the sale prayed for. If a sale can be ordered, then,
before the court can divide the proceeds, the mutual accounts of the
co-owners must properly be entertained and adjusted, in making a
just distribution. Andrews vs. Wall, 3 How. 568.
The question of the power of this court to order a sale, in a case
of disagreement among part owners, has been, and is still, in some
respects, a matter of equal importance and doubt. In coming to
that conclusion which I shall now announce, it is fitting that with
it I should state the reasons which have guided and governed me.
In Great Britain, the power of the admiralty to order a sale
among part owners, in case of disagreement, has been hitherto
stoutly denied. The case of Ousten vs. Hebden, 1 Wilson, 101, is
cited as the direct authority fu.r the opinion that the admiralty cannot compel a sale of a ship, on the application of a part owner who
objects to a certain voyage; .nd Lord Stowell, in the Apollo, 1
IIagg. 306, speaking of the s'fpulation, has declared that "beyond
this limit, the court has not n..ved."

408-

:-"
-

TUNNO vs. THE BETSINA. •

But it aids us very little to determine satisfactorily, the true
the
nature and extent of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction inin
courts
the
of
opinions
to
the
refer
to
States,
United
the
of
courts
Great Britain. In the first place, it is now generally conceded,
that the jurisdiction of this court, intended to be exercised in the
United States. is-not limited, as it was known in Great Britain anterior to:the revolution, and as declared by the courts of that kingdom. De Lovio vs. Boit, 2 Gall. 400; Propeller qenesee Chief
vs. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443.
In the next place, it is not always that we can be certain, that
even in the judgments of these courts, will we find a reliable exposition of the powers which have been admitted to belong to this
jurisdiction. In Great Britain, the right of the admiralty to order
a stipulation is now undoubted; yet in the Court of King's Bencb,
-. Chief Justice Holt held that the practice was unlawful; and by
others.the exercise of the jurisdiction was considered an assumption.
Abbott, 125. No one familiar with the acrimonious controversy
was carried on"in Great Britain, and had for its object the
.'hicli
b
suppression of the admiralty, and who recalls the disadvantages
under. which -the admirlty contended, -will hesitate in understanding
why a judge so eminent as Lord Stowell should acknowledge the
abstemiousness with which the admiralty always proceeded in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
Under the influence of this feeling, the admiralty in Great Britain, in its entertainment of all cases relating to the possession of
vessels, has discriminated by separating such questions, into possessory, where -the mere fact of possession was concerned; and petitory, in which a question of title was involved. In the former class,
exercising, and in the latter, refusing the exercise of its jurisdiction.
But in the United States, the distinction between these classes of

cases hhs never been recognized, and courts of admiralty from the
earliest period, in

this country, have entertained jurisdiction in

cases involving not only the question of possession, but that of title
also. The Tilton, 5 Mason, 468. It need scarcely be observed
thit in this they exercised a familiar jurisdiction which would not
have been attempted by a'judge holding admiralty jurisdicfion in
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Great Britain. In like manner in the United States, although a
mortgage of a vessel has been held not to be a marine contract or
hypothecation; and on that ground not to be foreclosed in the admiralty, Bogart vs. The John Jay, 17 How. 399, yet the right of
the mortgagee to intervene in the admiralty, if the vessel was
within the jurisdiction of the court, has been always maintained.
Andrews vs. Wall, 3 How. 568. But in England, proceeding from
the same doubt of the right of the court to interfere in a question
where title was even indirectly involved, a mortgagee could not intervene in behalf of his interest, until by the 3 and 4 Vict. c. 65,
§. 3, special authority is given to the admiralty to entertain jurisdiction in such cases, Abbott, 130.
While, then, the enactment of the British Parliament may be relied on as showing that until its passage there was in the court of
admiralty of that kingdom no authority to adjudicate a question
concerning a vessel in which title is involved, at the same time we
are able to see that the courts of the United States, by the exercise
of the same jurisdiction without any corresponding legislative provision, very plainly indicated their opinion that a question affecting
the title was not per 8e beyond their jurisdiction.
We are then enabled, in opening our examination of the question
here td be decided, to start with two principles of admitted admiralty jurisdiction in the United States. 1st, that disagreement
among part owners as to the employment of a vessel is a ground
for the interference of this court, admittedly so far as may be necessary to secure to the dissentient minority the value of their interest; and 2d, that in rejecting any distinction between the posses-"
sory and petitory proceedings, a jurisdiction was affirmed, although
a question of title might be involved.
It is well, also, to be borne in mind, that in the case of Ousten vs.
.Hebden, the question of a sale was not before the court. The application related solely to a stipulation, and the opinion of Chief
Justice Holt, is in fact, little more than obiter dictum: Abbott,
126, note.
L Unquestionably, in the administration of admiralty and maritimejurisdiction in Great Britain and the United States, this marked
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difference exists in the sources from which the law is derived, as
administered by each. In Great Britain the jurisdiction of the
court is determined, partly by legislation-by conferences among
th, judges-and the opinions of judges of the King's Bench, in
c-q.e4a before it, in which applications were made for a prohibition
against the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in some particular
:o.e. And we are constantly reminded that reference is not made
to.the maritime law of the world, to determine whether a case can
be adjudicated by a tribunal created originally for the administration of that jurisprudence, but to another tribunal not superior, but
equal, animated with a jealous rivalry equally unreasonable and unyielding.

Davis &' Brooks vs. The Seneca, 18 Am. Jur. 490.

It

is true, that the popular objection derived from the non, obstante
satoto clause in the admiralty commission, was rightfully one

which, in a government resting upon popular principles, should be
"watched,and indeed should be exploded. But the legitimate con' qtuknce of the argument from this, used against the admiralty,
thild have been extended to, and embraced the king himself.
the republican- government of England, a juster sense of the,
'Vpder
mode in which the admiralty jurisdiction should be administered,
seems to have been adopted; and the rule was then laid down, that
matters submitted to it, should be determined "according tb the
laws and customs of the sea ;" but this rule expired with the republican government, and was not re-enacted after the Restoration.
HalF Ad. Pr. 26 ; Benedict's Adm. 54.
Considered then in this light, the great argument against the exercise of this or any other' power, derived from the "abstemiousness" of the admiralty in Great Britain, to borrow the language of
Lord Stowell, loses much of the force it would otherwise possess.
We are not at liberty to consider the conduct of the admiralty
courts in Great Britain, as the evidence of such a jurisdiction being
inconsistent with the limits which should be here assigned to it.
And are forced, in this, as in many other questions, to seek other
sources of information, in enabling us to decide whether the power
is properly to be exercised or not.
I shall, therefore, proceed to examine and ascertain, so far as it
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can be done .with the sources of information within my reach, the
maritime law in relation to the employment and sale of a vessel.
In the marine ordinance of Louis 14th, it is thus laid down, sec. 5.
"1En tout ce qui concerne l'interest commun des proprietaires,
l'avis du plus grand nombre sera suivy; et sera, repute le Flus
grand nombre, celuy des interressey qui auront sa plus grande part
au vaisseau. Sec.6. Aucun ne pourra contraindre son associate de
proceder a la licitation, d'un navire commun, si ce, n'est que les
avis soient egallement partagez sur l'enterprize de quelque voyage."
Pardessus, 4, 856; Coll. de Lois Mar.
In the Consulat de la Mer, 2 Pard. 62, 68, 64, 65, and c. 10 and
11, there is more detail preserved in the statement of the rule, and
the reason for it. It is there laid down that no one shall sell his
share or interest in a vessel until she has completed her first voyage,
and this is said to arise from a consideration of what was due to the
captain. He was obliged to have a certain interest in the vessel,
had all the trouble and care of her construction, and would -be unprotected if his rights were left to his co-owners, who were influenced "par legerete de conduite, on parce qu-ils sont riches." But
when that voyage was ended, a larger part of the owners could have
the vessel sold, nor could the master oppose it, unless there had been
some special agreement entered into, on the subject. And this
sale so proceeding according to the wish of the majority, is stated
upon the principle, "qu' e n quelque chose, que ce soit, ou une discordance d'avis se manifeste, la volonte de la majorite l'emporte."
But these provisions seemed intended for the case of all, or a majority, (tous ou bien la'majeure partie,) of the part owners; it appears, however, that the captain had his correlative rights. "Le
patron a autant de droits pour forcer a la licitation les actionnaires
que ceux-ci en ont envers lui."
These provisions generally were adopted in the Code do Commerce : sec. 220, liv. 2, tit. 8. "En tout ce qui concerne l'interet
commun des proprietaires d'un navire, l'avis de la majorite est suivi.
La majorite se determine par une portion d'interet dans le navire,
excedant la moietie de sa valeur. La. licitation du navire ne peut
etre accord6o que sur la demande des proprietaires formant ensemI
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ble la moitie de l'interet total dans le navire, s'il n'y a par ecrit,
convention contraire."
In the law of the Hanse Towns, Droit Maritime de la Ligue Anseatique, 2 Pard. 527, there is no provision concerning a sale in
case of disagreement. The proceeding is declared to be such as
conforms "a I'ancien usage, qui etablit que ceux qui aurout lamoindre part, et le moins de voix, suivront l'avis de la majorite."
(Section 57.) It is, however, also provided in this code, that "1if
the master to displease his owners, (par animosite,) sells his part of
the ship for more than it is worth, they shall have the right to take
it at such valuation as arbitrators shall put upon it." (Section
54,) Id.
In the note of Roccus, translated by Mr. Ingersoll, it is said,
(note 47,) in "maritime controversies, the general maritime law is'
to be the rule of decision, provided it be not contrary to the law of
the land." There is no express provision concerning a sale, but in
'the 6th .note it is provided that if a ship has two owners, and both
choose a captain, the judge shall decide between them; and "if the
judge cannot effect a concurrence, the ship must remain without a
commander, until a concurrent appointment can be made ;" and in
note 49, "if a controversy arise among several owners of a vessel,
respecting different offers made for chartering a ship, he is preferred
who offers the highest freight, and if the freights offered are equal,
the judge will make the election to determine the dispute."
In 1793, in the United States Court in this State, Bee's Ad. 2,
an application was made to Judge Bee for a sale of the sloop Hope,
to make a division; and the application would appear to have been
rested upon the apprehension of some fraudulent conduct, intended
by the other part owner. The report of the case is brief, and far
from satisfactory, nor can I find any authority in the admiralty for
ordering a sale under the circumstances of the case, as they can be
gathered from the report. There was enough, in all probability, to
warrant a court of equity to interfere, and that court often exercises
its authority auxiliary to a court of admiralty, as in the matter of
a stipulation where the value of the vessel is uncertain. After
much reflection, I cannot recognize this case, as determining a ques-
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tion of disputed jurisdiction, with all the respect I have for the
learned judge by whom it was decided.
In 1800, in Pennsylvania, the case of Wellivgs vs. Blight, 2
Pet. Ad. 288, was decided by Judge Peters. In this ease, the
learned judge expresses an opinion as to the power of the court to
order a sale ; but the application in the case was not for a sale, but
to be allowed to give a stipulation that the ship might proceed on
her voyage. And the opinion so given as to the sale, seems rested*
on the Sea Laws, 442, and Beawes' Lex Mercatoria, 49. These
authorities, the latter particularly, I shall refer to hereafter. The
reference to the marine ordinances of France, does not appear to
have been made, except incidentally, and instead of making a decree for a sale, the learned judge declares that, "a privation of
freight, the fruit and crop of shipping, seems therefore to be the
appropriate mulct on indolent, perverse, or negligent part owners."
In 1828, in Pennsylvania, the question again arose in the case of
-Davis& Brooks vs. The Seneca, Gilpin, 10, before Judge Hopkinson. The libellants were owners of one-half the brig. The other
half of the brig was owned by the captain, who kept possession of
her. The case, in fact, was one of disagreement between owners of
equal shares as to the best employment of the vessel. Judge Hopkinson refused the sale, and an appeal was taken- to Judge Washington, who reversed the circuit decree, and ordered the sale. 18
Am. Jurist, 490. Judge Washington rested his judgment upon two
leading principles: 1st. That in determining admiralty jurisdiction we must not be confined to the restrictions which in Great
Britain have been adopted, but should refer to the general maritime
law. 2d. That in making such a reference, the provision in the
marine ordinances of France which provide for a sale, where a half
or a larger interest desire it, was to be regarded as laying down a wise
and salutary rule of the general maritime law, which he would enforce
as the maritime law of the United States. No further proceedings
by way of app.:al were taken in this case.
The opinion of Judge Washington, by an able commentator, is
said to have "the support of the most eminent authority," and to
express "the rule of American law." Fla iders on Shipping, 8T2.
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In the case of tlhi Steamboat Orleans vs. Phcebus, 11 Pet. 175,
Judge Story declared that "the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty
in cases of part owners having'unequal interests or shares, is not,
and never has been applied to -a direct sale, upon any dispute between them as to the trade and navigation of a ship engaged in
maritime voyages." - Nor do I understand him-although he is referred to as having done so-(Oollyer, 996, in note,) as extending
the jurisdiction at any time farther than the case of an equal division among the owners, in relation to the employment of the vessel.
Story on Part. see. 439. Although the title by which a vessel is
held is not subject to the general law of a partnership- by which
each partner has the power of disposition over the property of the
concern ; but instead of this, each stands to his associates in the relation of a tenant in common, with a perfect right to dispose of his
rown share, without affecting the shares of his co-owners; yet that
.general principle in all voluntary associations, by which the opinion
.of the majority controls in whatever relates to the subject matter of
-the common property, must still be recognized as applicable to the
ownership in vessels. In the references which I have made to the
established sources of the maritime law in Europe, it will be seen,
that this, to me, seemingly necessary authority in the majority, is
everywhere recognized as a part of the fundamental law. How far
the practice, adopted at a very early day in Great Britain, of qualifying the right, of the majority by a stipulation for the benefit of
the minority, is adopted among continental courts in the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction, it is not easy to ascertain; but in Great
Britain and in the United States, it is now recognized as an appropriate exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, and a proper condition to
lbe imposed upon the general authority vested in the majority of the
part owners for their employment of a vessel, against the wishes of
the minority.
The right of the majority to employ a vessel, against the wish of
a minority desiring some other voyage, subject to the condition 'of
giving a stipulation, is then clear, and the right of the majority to
employ a vessel against the wish of a minority not desiring any employment of the vessel, is equally clear, subject to the same condi-
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tion. The source of the right is in the fact of there being a majority
in interest who favor the employment; but superadded to it, is another
reason, derived from the considerations of public policy, and which
is said to require the employment of vessels. Whether in the case
w'ere a majority desiring the employment of a vessel, a minority
t desiring any employment, and that majority unable to make a
sdflicient stipulation; considerations of public policy would override
the condition for the stipulation, or the latter will 'be preserved to'
the suppression of the former, and the destruction of the vessel, is
a question yet to be decided; and upon its decision depends the decision of another question, which is, whether the order for a stipulation is a matter of right, or subject in any degree to the discretion
of the court. If the order for the stipulation be a matter of right,
then it may be, that the inability of the majority to give it, might
present the case of the vessel rotting in her dock. "The righ,
(says Judge Story, Part. sec. 439,) to order a sale of property subject to its jurisdiction, is clearly a matter within the competency of
a court of admiralty, and indeed is familiar in practice, in order to
prevent irreparable mischief, or impending losses." But conceding
this to be so, as of course it must be, upon the familiar principle
that a court has the power to preserve the subject of its jurisdiction
pen dente lite, yet it does not aid us in resolving the doubt, for the
propositions stand to each other in this position; if the power of
sale is in the court, (in case of irreparable mischief or impending
loss,) it is because the case and the thing to which the case relates,
is within its jurisdiction, and if the case is subject to its jurisdiction
the power of sale (in the cases stated in the text) is necessarily in
the court. The solution of either will determine the other, but
neither or both decide the real question, whether a power in the
admiralty to decree the sale of a vessel, as a substantive power, is
or not, within its jurisdiction.
I have had occasion to refer to the article in the marine ordinances of Louis 14th, which provides that in everything which concerns the common interest of the owners, the opinion of the greater
number will prevail; and farther, that, that shall be reputed the
greater number which represents the !arqer interest. By this, the
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major part may employ the vessel in a certain voyage, by the mere
fact of being the major part, though the minority object, 1 Valin's
Cora. 582, and such is the law in England, with the qualification of
a stipulation for the minority, Beawes, 45; Molloy, 61, c. 1, 220.
. 3ut ifbhe major part do not desire to employ the vessel, but the
minority do so desire, what then shall be the rule ? According to
the marine ordinances of Louis 14th, in this question, as in others, the
rule of the majority prevailed; and if they so desired it the vessel
would remain unemployed, 1 Valin's Com. 582. But in England
the rule would seem to be different, for it is laid down, that if but
one is left for the voyage, yet the same right to employ the vessel,
subject of course to the stipulation, shall be with him, Molloy, 220.
To this is added, in the text, the seeming qualification, "1especially
if there be equality in the partnership," p. 120. On the other
hand, .Beawes lays it down, that if the greatest part refuse to fit out
.hevessel,
t
they shall not be compelled on account of the{r majority,
buit the ship shall be valued and sold. Beawes Lex. Mere. 49.
Cleirdc, as cited by Valin, 582, declares, that if two citizens own a
ship, the one who wishes to navigate or employ; (lun d'iceux vent
qu'il navige,) and the other opposes, the right of him who wishes to
navigate shall prevail. To the same effect, is Kuricke, sur le droit
Hanseatique, 759, cited inValin ut sup. "Certe eum prevalere de-.
bere qui navim navigare, quam otiosam domi manere mavult." And
to these follow Strachha de navibus, cited also in Valin, and who
rests upon the principle that in association their wish should be consulted, who desire to employ a vessel in that use for which she was
constructed. And the same conclusion, as to the right of the minority in such a case, was adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Steamboat Orleans vs. Phwbus, 11 Pet. 175.
I do not find the rule as laid down in Beawes, in the case of the
refusal of a majority to employ the vessel, so expressed in any other
authority. By the French law, the opinion of thQ majority would
prevail, and the minority would have to submit. But according to
Molloy, if the major part refuse to employ the ship, the minority
shall have the privilege of employing her on the same terms which
would have been imposed on the majority, that is, giving a stipula-
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tion for the shares of the dissenting part owners, in case of loss,
and in this, concur Oleirac, Kuricke, Straccha, and Judge Story.
If we come to a closer examination and summary of the general
maritime law upon this question, we shall arrive at these results:
A vessel, although the subject of private ownership, is regarded as a
matter also of public interest. The public interest is protected in
securing the employment of the vessel. In the management of a
vessel, the opinion of the majority in value shall prevail, unless it
forbids its employment, in which case it yields to the minority desiring its employment. The sale of a vessel is not encouraged,
because the interference of the court in aiding a discontented part
owner to force a sale, would in many cases serve only to gratify caprice or passion, tend to the injury of other part owners, and invite
frequent and injurious interruptions of commercial operations. In
case of disagreement between part owners who have an equal interest concerning the employment of the vessel, a sale will be ordered,.
but such disagreement must not be upon the question of employ-.
ment or not, for in such case, they who desire to employ, shall prevail, but it must be a disagreement as to the manner in which the.
vessel shall be employed.
It seems to me that in these cases of disagreement among part.
owners, to which branch of the general question I confine myself,
the admiralty will decree a sale; if beyond these, a sale will be ordered, it must depend upon some special considerations connected;
with a certain case out of which no general rule can be framed. In.
the first of these cases, a sale will be ordered, because it is impracticable to decide the differences. between .the owners by the ap,
plication of any other principle of the maritime law. In the second
case, because by the application of the general rule of the maritime
law, injury may ensue. In the third case, because it carries into
execution a fundamental rule of the maritime law. The first case
is illustrated by a disagreement between owners equal in interestj
and both desiring to employ the vessel ; here it will be seen that the
rule respecting the wish of the mxajority cannot prevail for they are
equally divided, nor can you dt tide this difference by the rule which
gives the preference to such as wish to employ the vessel for both de27

TUNNO vs. THE BETSINA.

sire to do so. It is obvious, then, that as no ground exists for the
preference of one over the other, a sale is necessary. The second
case is illustrated by what has been already hypothetically stated,
where the minority do not wish to employ the vessel, but the
majority who wish to employ the vessel, cannot give a sufficient
stipulation. If the court cannot exercise a discretion in dispensing
with the stipulation-and it would seem as if it were a matter of
right which, demanded by the minority, cannot be refused-then a
sale would also be necessary to prevent the destruction of the
property. The third case, is where a majority in value showing it
to be for the general good, ask for a sale; and in granting it the
principle is recognized that the opinion of the majority in value
shall prevail, which by the Consulat de la Mer is specially applied
to a sale.
Nor should it be forgotten, that when these principles of maritime
law were laid down, a greater necessity existed for the exercise by
the court of the power to sell than can now be presented. Then a
restraint was imposed upon the exercise of the owner's right to sell,
in some cases until a voyage was performed, in others until the expiration of a certain period of time. During the period when the
right of the owner was thus controlled, a necessity would seem to
exist for a power in the court to order a sale, but I find it nowhere
affirmed. But now the owner may at any time, to any person, and
for any price, dispose of the vessel, or his share, and consequently
no corresponding necessity exists from considerations of what is
due to private rights. It is true, that in former days vessels were
rather regarded as the means by which trade was encouraged and
commerce sustained, than as in themselves objects of trade as any
other kind of property. And this serves to explain the stringency
of the rules by which they were managed. But the unrestricted
power of disposition which now is exercised by every owner, provides a remedy for perhaps most cases of irreconcilable disagreement. Doubtless there are cases in which the exercise of this
power would be attended with disadvantage, but such a consequence
may 'esult in any case where one having joined an association, sells
his interest and retires. If the disadvantage is produced or enhanced by his associates, or in any other way invites the interfer-
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ence of the court, it will be afforded. If within the jurisdiction of
the admiralty, it will give the proper relief. If not within the
jurisdiction of the admiralty, a court of equity will' be found adequate to.the occasion, proper for the exercise of its authority.
I consider that the power to sell, as exercised by Judge Washington, in the case of The Seneca, was carried as far as the best authorities in the maritime law will warrant. Nor is it easy to comprehend for what useful purpose the power could be exercised, in
any other cases than such as I have referred to, in which a disagreement between part owners cannot be determined by the operation
of principles applicable to associated ownership, or such as are specially provided for an ownership in vessels. Of what use would be
the principle which affirms the control resulting to a majority from
the fact of its being so, if in any case in which it was to be applied,
a court would be asked to decree a sale ? It would soon be that
the only mode for preventing a dissolution, would be for the majority to render unquestioning accord to the wishes of the minority;
no matter how small that minority, or unreasonable its exactions.
In this case, the libellant is not the owner of a-half of the vessel.
He represents a minority in value. And the examination now
made satisfies we that he is not entitled to a decree for a sale on
the ground of disagreement with the other part owners as to the
best mode of employing the vessel owned by them in common.
The second ground upon which the libellant asks a sale, is that
he became the purchaser of the share now owned by him in the
vessel under certain representations made to him as to the employment of the vessel; that these have not been fulfilled, and the neglect has been productive of injury to him. This is no ground for a
sale. If the representations were all that the libellant considers
them, and if they were connected with it and affected the other part
owners as if made by them, it would be a case for relief but not for
a sale. Part owners may agree as to the mode in which the vessel
shall be managed, and the substance of the representations charged
by the libellant as made to him is not unusual in such agreements.
It is simply that the libellant should have the agency of the vessel
trade. Such an
for the purpose of employing her in the Florida
I
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agreement properly made out by proof and affecting the other part
owners, would be enforced in this court, not upon the ground of the
specific performance of an agreement, which is an appropriate head
of equity and not of admiralty jurisdiction, but as a maritime contract. Whatever may be the representations made to the libellant
by the captain, they have not been proved to affect the other owners. There is no evidence that.such representations from the captain to the libellant were ever known to them. It was not an agreement which the captain, in that capacity, had authority to make, so
as to bind the owners, nor as co-owner had he authority to bind his
associates by any such agreement. He may have incurred a personal liability to the libellant, but he has not affected the other
owners with any liability.
. The libel can only be retained for the stipulation which it asks,
and which has been granted. -The rest of the prayer, which asks
for an account and sale, is refused.

In the Supreme Court of Vermont-Rutland County, Pebuary
Term, 1856.
BOWEN & M'NAMEE Vs. ADDISON BUCK AND DAVID WARREN.
1. The law will permit a compromise of any offence though made the subject of a
criminal prosecution, for which offence the injured party might recover damages
in an' action, but if the offence is of a public nature, no agreement can be valid
that is founded on the consideration of stifling a prosecution for it.
2. Therefore, where the plaintiff's agent induced the giving of the note on which
this action is brought by representing that a prosecution had been instituted and
by agreeing to settle and stop that prosecution, the use made of this alleged prosecution to compel the giving of the note, renders the contract void.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ch. J.-Tho question in the present case is, whether
the plaintiffs' agent having induced the giving of the note in suit, by
representing that a prosecution for obtaining goods by false pretences, had been instituted in the State of New York, and the proper
REDFIELD,
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steps taken to arrest the defendant Buck, in this State, for the purpose of carrying him into New York for trial, and by agreeing to
settle and stop the prosecution, the note is collectable, even if in
point of fact the representations were false.
The plaintiffs' agent having obtained the note by these representations, and the plaintiff now seeking to enforce the note, implicates the plaintiff in these transactions of his agent. And having
made the representations and induced the defendants to act upon
them, he would now be estopped from denying them, so that as to
both parties probably, as is held in Dixon vs. Olmsted, 9 Vt. R.
310, we may now regard as facts all the representations which were
made and acted upon, and equally that the defendant is to be treated,
as he chose to treat himself, as guilty.
In this view of the facts it is obvious, from the English cases referred to in the argument, and which are thoroughly reviewed in
the late case of Kier vs. Leeman, 6 Ad. &Ellis, N. S. 308, that they
are not, perhaps, altogether reconcilable, or the principle upon which
they profess to go, easily to be discovered. But it is certain that
the English statutes and the English practice, allow the party aggrieved far more control and agency in wielding criminal prosecutions for his own private advantage than has ever been allowed
here. It seems to be supposed there, that in a certain class of inferior misdemeanors, the party aggrieved, and who has a private
remedy for the same act, may use the criminal prosecution for the
mere purpose of xompelling a settlement of the private injury, and
when the party is satisfied, the public prosecution is disposed of by
a nominal fine. This has always been the English practice as to
assaults and batteries, and it is obvious they have extended it to a
class of misdemeanors affecting chiefly the interest of private persons, like nuisances. Baker vs. Townsend, 7 Taunt. 422; Bhorthy
vs. Bird, 1 Sim. & Stu. 372; Beesly vs. Wingfield, 11 East, 46 ;
.Draye vs. Iberson, 2 Esp. 0. 643; Fallowes vs Taylor, 7 T. R.
475.
But in a class of cases quite numerous in the English books, it
seems to have been considered that if the prosecution was one affecting public morals or example, it could not be controlled by a
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private party, for his own purposes. Of this character are the following:
Pool vs. Bousfield, I Camp. 55, this seems to have been a case
ing money to hush a prosecution for matters in an affidavit.
.Ndgcomb vs. .odd, 5 East, 294, was a prosecution for disturbing
a religious meeting, and the court held it could not be compromised
ollins vs. Blanton, 2 Wilson,
by the parties affected mainly.
841, 849, where it was held that a contract to withdraw a prosecution for perjury is founded on an unlawful consideration, and void,
and in the principal case referred to, Kier vs. Leeman, it was held
that the "parties might compromise all offences, though made the
subject of a criminal prosecution, for which the injured party might
sue and recover damages, but that in the present case the offence is
not confined to personal injury, but is accompanied with riot and
obstruction of a public officer in the execution of his duty."
These are matters of public concern, and therefore not legally the
subject of a compromise."
This is the lateft English case on the subject which has been
brought to our notice. The distinction here attempted, if we correctly apprehend the meaning of the learned judge, is between prosecutions for such acts as exclusively affect private persons, and
involve no considerable proportion of moral turpitude, or any'infamy
of punishment, or personal disqualification, or seriously affect the
public, that is between assaults and batteries, and nuisances, and
offences of this grade, and such as involve the offender in infamous
punishment, and personal disability, and externally concern the
public order and well-being. There is another distinction aimed at,
but not well defined ; it is that the class of crimes which the English
law will not allow the injured party to compromise, and which involve
something entirely different from the mere act which constitutes
a private injury. As theft, for instance, which always involves a
trespass; or embezzlement, which involves a liability for the money
or thing embezzled : but beyond all this there is involved a felonious
purpose and intent, which constitutes the essence of the crime, and
which seriously concerns the administration of public justice.
To apply these distinctions to the present case, it is obvious that'
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the obtaining goods by false pretences, does involve an act for
which a private action will lie, as was held by this court in Poorvs.
Woodlurn, 25 Vt. R. 234. It is true, the party selling the goods
under the alleged false pretences, is precluded from an action of
tort, by insisting upon his securities taken upon the sale and attempting to enforce them, thereby affirming the sale. It is considered
that he must, upon the earliest notice of the alleged fraud, abandon
his securities and demand the goods, Kingsford vs. Merry, 34 Eng.
R. 607. If so, he may bring trover as in the case last cited, and
in Fitzsimmons vs. Joslin, 21 Vt. R. 129, but the party cannot
hold on upon his contrac: for the price of the goods, and also sustain
an action for the fraud, as the remedies are deemed inconsistent;
but there is something more than the mere concession of the party's
g9ods in this offence. There is involved fraud of a very dangerous
character to public confidence, and in the punishment of which the public have a deep interest, and which, by the law of most commercial
States, is attended, upon conviction, with infamous punishment and
personal disability. At common law, this class of frauds was regarded as intimately related to, if not in fact, a part of the crimen
falsi.
We think, therefore, that by the rules of the English common
law, the use made of this prosecution for the public offence, to compel security for the price of the goods, renders the contract void as
against the soundest principles of public policy. In regard to this
class of offences, with us denominated high crimes and misdemeanors,
until the Revised Statutes, it was long since decided by this court,
that prosecution after the offender was arrested and bound for his
trial before the court having jurisdiction to try, must be by the
public prosecuting officers. State Treasurer vs. Bice et al. 11 Vt.
R. 339. The important distinction between the mode of prosecuting
offences in England and this country, is there pointed out, and commented upon by Williams, Ch. J., and in this State, there can be no
question, we think, that the use made of this public accusation of
crime has long been regarded as an abuse of public justice to private and sinister ends, which the law will not allow. The cases of
Sumner vs. ffinesburgh, 9 Vt. R. 23; and -Dixonvs. Olmsted, id.
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810, seem to cover- the important question involved in this case,
and the case of Show vs. Spooner, 9 New H. R. 196, is almost
idbntical -with the present, and all these cases stand, as we think,
upon ground that is altogether unassailable.
I question, very seriously, whether in this State, a private person has any right to use any public or private prosecution for crime
of any grade;for the purpose of inducing a settlement, security or
paymeht Of a private claim, for private loss or injury. At all
events it 'must be considered as well settled everywhere, that no such
use can be made of a prosecution for a crime of the character here
indicated.
The fact, that this note was given for the agreed price of the
goods, is certainly not decisive. The party without the use made
of the public prosecution, might not have been able to obtain security for that amount, or any part of it. If so, he should not have resorted to this abuse of a public prosecution. It is. not duress, but
illegality which makes this contract ineffectual. This, of course,
may be taken advantage of by all parties in defence.
Judgment affirmed.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
THE STATE OF OHIO EX REL. WALTER HINCHMAN, (A MINOR)
NEXT FRIEND, DAVID

3Y mIS

H. TAYLOR VS. MORGAN HINCHMAN.

1. The record of a judgment obtained in a Probate Court of Ohio in a proceeding
upon habeas corpus, is within the provisions of the Act of Congress of 26th May,
1790, providing for the authentication of records from sister States.
2. In an action brought in this State upon a judgment, certified under said act as
a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the courts of this State are
bound to take notice of the local laws of the sister State, in the same manner
as that court would do on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of this State.
3. The act of Congress does not forbid the union of the offices of judge and clerk in
the same person; and it is no objection, therefore, to the attestation and certificate of a record from a sister State, that they are both given by the same person,
where the laws of that State provide for such union.
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4. The act of Congress does not preclude any other evidence of the authenticity of
a record of a sister State, which the courts of another State may deem competent-

5. Where the record itself shows that the person giving the certificate must necessarily have been ,the julge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate" of the court,
it is not material or requisite to the validltyof the authentication of a record,
under the act of Con,.ress, that the lauguage of the certificate it-self should exclude

every other supposition.

Debt on a judgment of a Probate Court of Ohio, for costs
accrued in proceeding by habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus,
in the name of the State of Ohio, at the suggestion of Walter Hinchman, (a minor) by his n-xt friend, was issued out of the Probate
Court of Hamilton County, Ohio, directed to the sheriff, commanding him to have the body of said Walter before said court forthwith,
and to summon Morgan Hinchman, to appear and show cause why
he, as it was said, imprisoned and restrained of his liberty, the said
Walter. The sheriff produced the body of the said Walter in court,
and summoned the said Morgan, who appeared and filed his answer
to the petition on which the habeas corpus was grounded. The
matter was regularly proceeded in, and a final decree rendered, by
which it was adjudged that the said Morgan deliver up and set free
the said Walter from all restraint and custody, and pay the costs of
the proceeding, taxed at $438 83. The present action was debt
upon said judgment to recover the amount of said costs. The pleas
were, nul tiel record, payment, and set off, with leave, &c.
Upon the trial, the plaintiff offered in evidence a certified copy of
the record of the proceedings upon the habeas corpus ; to which the
defendant objected as not being such a record as is within the Act
of Congress, and as not being authenticated. according to the provisions of said act. The authentication was as follows:
The State of Ohio, Hamilton- County, ss.
I, John B. Warren, Judge, and ex-officio Clerk of the Probate
Court within and for the County of Hamilton, and. State of Ohio,
do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript
of the record and proceedings of said Probate Court, in the case of
the State of Ohio ex rel. IFater Hinchman vs. JNlorgan Hinclanan,
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on a writ of habeas corpus, as the same remains of record and on file
in said court.
...
.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand,
H~,tae o.

o co

..............

ano

afxe

out

and affixed the seal of the sail Court, at Cincinnati,

this ninth day of January, in the year of our Lord one

thousand eight hundred and fifty-five.
J. B. WARREN, Probate .Tudae and ex-officio Clerk.

The State of Ohio, Hamilton County, ss.
I, John B. Warren, Judge of the Probate Court, within and for
the county of Hamilton and State of Ohio, do hereby certify that
J. 3. Warren, whose signature is attached to the foregoing certificate, is now, and was at the time of signing the same, ex-officio clerk
of the said Probate Court, and that his attestation is in due form of
law, and is entitled to full faith and credit.
.
.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand,
ft......
and affixed the seal of said court, at Cincinnati, this
ninth day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and fifty-five.
J. B. WARREN, Probate .Tudge.

The record itself stated that the proceedings were had before
"J. B. Warren, sole judge," &c. The court overruled the objections,
and admitted the evidence, reserving the points; to which the
defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for
-463 04, subject to the opinion of the court on the points reserved.
The court afterwards entered judgment for the plaintiff on the points
reserved, and on the plea of nul tiel record, whereupon the defendant took this writ of error.
S. C. Perkins and S. Ei. Perkins, for plaintiff in error.
1. A record of proceedings upon a habeas corpus issued out of a
Probate Court of the State of Ohio, is not such a record as is within
the act of Congress of 26th May, 1790. The ricord of any judgment of any court of a sister State would be treated in all respects
as a foreign judgment, were it not for Art. IV., Sec. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress. This act
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makes certain provisions for the authentication of records and judicial proceedings; but does not provide for all cases. TWarren vs.
Flagg, 2 Pick. 448. It must appear that the court whose alleged
record is offered in evidence was such a court as necessarily keeps a
record. Jurisdiction will be presumed in regard to courts whose
names are derived from the common law, and where the record itself
bears every evidence of being of a court of record. -But the very
name "1'ro,ate Court," implies a court of limited jurisdiction.
The proceedings of probate courts are not according to the common law; it cannot be presumed that they have any jurisdiction of
a matter of habeas corpus, which is emphatically a common law
writ.
Proceedings upon a -habeas corpus, are not such proceedings of
which a record is bound to be made, or presumed to be kept. It must
be shown affirmatively, that the probate judge is authorized and bound
to keep a record of proceedings under a habeas corpus.
A decision of one judge or court upon a matter of habeas corpus,
is not binding upon any other judge or court. Comm'th vs. Biddle,
6 P. L. J., 28.7, Cornm'th vs. Fox, 1 id. 227; S. 0. 7 Barr, 336.
Such a proceeding is not regarded as possessing even the ordinary
aturibute of a judgment, that it cannot be inquired into collaterally;
but it is treated with still less respect, as if it never had an existence.
A proceeding upon a habeas corpus is not ordinarily the subject of
revision by a superior court; no writ of error or appeal lies, unless
by special and express provision.
The very fact that the Probate Court had no clerk, distinct from
the judge, shows the inferior character of the court. -Duval vs.
_Ells, 13 Missouri, 203.
The cases in which it has been expressly decided, or strongly
intimated, that records of proceedings. before Justices of the Peace
are not within the Act of Congress, are analogous. And the
reasonig of many of these cases proceeds on the very ground of
the absurdity of the same man certifying as clerk, and then, under
another title, certifying that what he has done as clerk, is correct.
RY.an vs. Bice, 12 S. & R. 208, Snyder vs. Wise, 10 Barr, 160;
Polinson vs. Prescott,4 New Hampshire, 450 ; lJlahurinvs. Biek
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ford, 6 id. 570; Cay vs. Lloyd, 1 Green, (Iowa,) 78; Silver Lake
Bank vs. Harding, 5 Ohio, 546.
The act of Congress is carefully drawn; but one amendment,
(1804,) having been found necessary in the course of nearly seventy
years. It is reasonable to infer, where one exceptional case has
been provided for by the words "if there be a seal," that had there
been any intention to provide for the contingency of the clerk and
judge being the same person, equally express words would have been
inserted.
The jurisdiction of a court of inferior jurisdiction should have been
shown affirmatively, before the record was admitted. If it had no
jurisdiction, the record of the proceedings was no record as to the
defendant. Thomas vs. _obinson, 3 Wendell, 267; Bloom vs.
Burdiek, 2 Hill N. Y. Rep., 130. But the alleged record was
offered upon its own inherent merits simply.
The Constitution and act of Congress do not prevent inquiry
into the jurisdiction of a court of a sister State, Starbuck vs. Murray, 5 Wendell, 158; Noyes vs. Butler, 6 Barbour S. C. Rep., 613;
5'treet vs. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447.
2. But the authentication of the record is defective. The certificate does hot show that the certifying officer is "the judge, .chief
justice, or presiding officer," Lothrop vs. Blake, 8 Barr, 487;
Hudson vs. Daily, 13 Alabama, 722; Stephenson vs. Bannister, 3
Bibb, 369. The fact that the certificate of the clerk and that of
the judge are given by the same individual, is a further defect.
The Act of Congress manifestly contemplates the clerk as distinct
from the judge. Nor can any statute of Ohio which may authorize
a probate judge to act as his own clerk, affect the act of Congress.
In Lothrop vs. Blake, supra, where the question arose upon the
authentication of a record from Ohio, the attestation of which was
by a deputy clerk, Rogers, J, says expressly, nor will the statute
of Ohio, which enables deputies to perform the duties of the principal, make the authentication of the record by him evidence; as this
would enable the several States to alter and control the Act of
Congress. It must be construed by itself independent of legislative
enactments. The independent certificate of a distinct individual,
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the one best fitted to know the fact, that the attestation is in due
form, is provided for. But this provision is practically abrogated,
if the same individual by appending to his name distinct titles, can
be allowed to discharge both functions. It is no guaranty, no
assurance at all in respect to the verity of the record. And see the
cases in reference to proceedings before justices of the peace, cited
supra.
Chtarles Gibbons, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-This was an action of debt brought to recover a
large bill of costs for which judgment had been rendered against
the defendant by the Probate Court of Hamilton county, Ohio, in
a proceeding by htabeas corpus before that court. When the plaintiff offered the certified copy of the record in evidence, attested
by J. B. Warren, Probate Judge, and ex-officio Clerk, under the
seal of the court, and certified by J. B. Warren, as Probate Judge,
also under the seal of the court, the defendant objected to it as not
being such a record as is within the act of Congress, and not being
authenticated agreeably to the same act. The court overruled the
objection, and having admitted the record, decided that the proceedings under a writ of habeas corpus would support the present action,
and these are the grounds of the errors assigned.
There was no proof offered in reference to the constitution and
jurisdiction of the Probate Court of Ohio, but we suppose we are
bound, in the circumstances of this case, to take notice ex officio of
the local laws of Ohio. The questions before us arise under the
constitution and laws of the United States. Full faith and credit
shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial
proceedings cf every other State, says the federal constitution; and
the act of Congress of 26th of May, 1790, providing for the mode
of authenticating the records and judicial proceedings of the State
courts, declares that "the records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as afiw esaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them
in every court within the United States, as they have by law or
WOODWARD,
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usage in the courts- of the State from whence the said records are or
shall be taken."
A judgment of this court adverse to the right arising out of the
foderal constitution and legislation would be reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States, and there the States of the
confederacy are not regarded as foreign States, whose laws and
usages must be proved, but as domestic institutions whose laws are
'to be noticed without pleading or proof. It would be a very imperfect and discordant administration for the court of original jurisdiction to adopt one rule of decision, while the court of final resort was
governed by another, and hence it follows, that in questions of this
sort, we should take notice of the local laws-of a sister State in the
same manner the Supreme Court of the United States would do on
a writ of error to our -judgment. 7 Cranch, 408; Id. 481 ; 8
Wheat. 234 ; 'Baxley vs. Liynch, 4 Harris, 243.
Referring ourselves, thenf to the laws of Ohio, we find that by the
7tb section of the 4th article of her constitution of 1851, a court of
probate is establishdd in each county, "which shall 'be a court of
record, open at all times and holden by one judge;" and by the 8th
section, jurisdiction in habea8 corpus, "as may be provided by law,"
is, among othet powers, expressly conferred upon this court.
By an act of assembly defining the jurisdiction and regulating
the practice of probate courts, passed the 14th of March, 1858,
concurrent jurisdiction with the other courts is conferred upon the
probate courts in allowing and issuing writs of habeas corpus, and
in determining the validity of the capture and detention of persons
brought up on such writs. By section 10 of this act, the judges of
said courts have the care and custody of all files, papers, books and
records belonging to the -probate office, and are authorized and empowered to perform the duties of clerks of their own courts, or to
appoint deputies to act as clerks for them.
By section 15, orders for the payment of money may be enforced
by execution or otherwise, in the same manner as judgments in the
Court of Common Pleas.
By the 11th section of an act relating to habeas corpus, passed
8th February, 1847, the judge before whom the writ is returnable
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has power, after hearing, to tax the costs and fees allowed by law
to witnesses and officers, and "where the person was in custody by
virtue or under color of proceedings in any civil case, such costs
shall be taxed against the party at whose instance such person was
so in custody, in case he shall be discharged; but against such person so in custody in case he shall be remanded to custody."
From all this it appears, first, that the Probate Court had jurisdiction to render the judgment sued on. The costs accrued in proceedings in a civil case. And this appearing, upon an inquiry
which we are bound to institute, it matters not that the Probate
Court ranks as an inferior tribunal, and not as one of those superior
courts who exercise a common law jurisdiction, and whose acts and
judgments are conclusive in themselves-for the strictness with which
the proceedings of inferior tribunals are scrutinized, only applies to
the question of jurisdiction, and when the existence of that is proved
or conceded, the maxim omnia rite acta applies to them as well as
to courts of general jurisdiction. 1 Smith's Leading Cases, (H. &
W.) 817.
The next conclusion which results from the local laws of Ohio, is
that the record of the Probate Court was well attested and certified.
The act of Congress requires the attestation of the clerk and the
seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case
may be, that the said attestation is in due form.
Here we have the attestation, the seal, and the certificate, in due
form; but it is said the act of Congress contemplated the record of
a court having both a judge and a clerk, whose official acts should
be a check on each other. Doubtless. But it does not forbid the
union of the two offices in the same person, nor invalidate formal
and legal acts because performed by one and the same hand.
The remark of Chief Justice Tilghman, in Kean vs. Rice, 12 S.
& R. 208, that if the New Jersey justices of the peace, whose record
he was considering, had no clerk, it would be impossible to comply
with the act of Congress, does not apply here, because the Probate
Court of Hamilton county has a clerk, and that clerk has attested
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the record under the seal of the court; and by the laws of Ohio the
judge of the court is lawfully the clerk of the court.
In form this is a strict compliance with the act of Congress, and
in substance it is an essential compliance. But even if this were not
a sufficient compliance with the act of Congress, we would still treat
it as an adequate authentication upon general principles, and independently of the act of Congress. That act prescribes a general rule
which makes records admissible in every State, but it does not exclude any other evidence which the courts of a particular State may
deem competent. Baker vs. Field, 2 Yeates, 532 ; Kean vs. Bice,
12 S. & R. 203.
The only remaining objection that the certificate does not show
that it is by the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate of the
court, is answered by the record itself, which describes J. B. Warren as sole judge of the court, and by the constitution and laws of
Ohio, which show that the Probate Court is to consist of a single
judge.
This record of a'judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, and certified in substantial compliance with the act of
Congress, is entitled to "full faith and credit"-an expression which
the act of Congress defines to be "such faith and credit as it has
by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence it comes."
In that State it would be ground for an action of debt and evidence
to charge the defendant. In the particular forum where the judgment was rendered, it would be ground also of an execution ; but we
give it, not the remedial effect of the former, but the credit which
the State gives it in her tribunals. With them it would not be
ground of execution, but of an action, and with us it is the same.
The judgment is affirmed.

M'INTYRE vs. KENNEDY.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
JOHN M'INTYRE VS. KENNEDY, CIILDS & CO.
1. Where A, the debtor paid to B, the creditor two checks, one his own, and one
that of a third party, the mere taking of the checks for a pre-existing debt and
without any express-agreement that they should be payment, does not make
them payment; and A is liable to B for the second check, if worthless or unpaid,
although it is the check of a stranger and A's name does not appear upon it.
2. The principle ruled in Bayard vs. Shunk, 1 Watts, & Serg. 95, affirmed.
3 It is a general rule that if one indebted to another by simple contract give his
creditor a promissory note or check drawn by himself for the same amount, without any new consideration, the check or note shall not be deenied a satisfaction
of the original debt, unless so intended and accepted by the parties.
4. Whether a debtor pays out his note or check or the note or check of a third
party, the creditor, in the absence of any special agreement, may resort to his
debtor if the check or note is unpaid.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-A creditor applies to his debtor for part payment of the debt, and receives from him his own check and the
check of a third party, the latter of which, on presentment in due
time, is refused payment,-is this satisfaction pro tanto as between
the debtor and creditor? or, in other words, which of them is to
sustain the loss of the worthless check ?
We suppose that among business men this question would be of
easy solution; that a check given by a debtor, whether his own or
another's for a pre-existing dcbt, would be regarded as conditional
payment, as payment if paid, and that if, with reasonable diligence
on the part of the holder, it proved worthless in his hands, the
debtor would be obliged to receive it back and pay the amount of it
to his creditor. The rights and liabilities of the parties would of
course be controlled by any express agreement between them, but
where there is none, where it is a simple payment and receipt of a
check, supposed by both parties to be good, the debt is not satisfied
until the cheek is paid. The holder assumes the duty of presenting
the check and demanding paym-ent within a reasonable time, and if
he neglects to do so, and the banker fails after the time it ought to
have been presented, the loss is to be borne by the holder, not by
28
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reason of the receipt of the check, but of his negligence which has
occasioned the loss. He may not charge against his debtor the
consequences of his own neglect, and this, on the same principle of
natural justice, which forbids the debtor to take advantage of his
wrong in issuing a worthless check to a bona fide creditor. These
principles are of every day's application among business men, but
the case before us questions them and compels us to look into the
authorities to see if they have not the obligatory force of law.
The argument on the part of the defendants in error resolves
itself into the assumption that checks are of the same quality as
bank notes, and then applies the principle of Bayard vs. Skunk, 1
W. & S., 95, wherein it was held that a payment, by a sheriff, in
current bank notes, discharges the debt, although, in consequence
of the previous failure of the bank, of which both parties were
ignorant, the notes were of no value at the time of payment.
But neither the assumption nor the application can be sustained
Checks resemble bills of exchange rather than bank notes, (Chitty
on Bills, 17 7 T. R., 430 ; 3 Johnson C., 5.) and fall within that
class of securities which Chief Justice Gibson, in this very case of
Bayard vs. Shunk, so broadly distinguished from the common
currency of the country. Like bills of exchange, they are open
letters of request for the payment of money to a particular 'person,
or his order, or to bearer. They are drawn against a supposed
deposit. They are not payment, but an order on the depository to
make payment for the drawer. When payable to bearer they pass
by mere delivery, like bank notes, but so do promissory notes and
bills of echange. The grand distinction between all these securities
and bank notes is, that by the conventional rules of business they
do not enter at all into the currency of the country, a very large
part of which is made up of bank notes. These are lent by the
banks as cash, they are paid away as cash, and the language of
Lord Mansfield, in Miller vs. Race, 1 Burr. 452, was not too strong
when he said, "they are. not goods, nor securities, nor documents
for debts; but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course
and transaction of business, by the general consent of mankind,
which gives them the credit and currency of money, to all intents
and purposes; they are as much money, as guineas themselves are, or
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any other coin that is used in common payments as money or cash."
't was on the ground of this distinction, that Bayard vs. Shunk,
was ruled. The parties dealt in the common currency of the country,
each of whom had the same opportunity to know its character, and
both of whom were ignorant of its worthlessness, and therefore they
were held to what they had done. But that case, so far from being
pressd into the service of the defendants, is an authority against
them. "If the securities," says the chief justice, in speaking of
bills and notes-among which, I submit, it is giving checks all the
d1ignity that is their due, to rank them-" If the securities are
transferred for a debt contracted at the time, the presumption is,
they are received in satisfaction of it; but if for a precedent debt,
it is that they are received as collateral security for it, and in either
case it may be rebutted by direct or circumstantial evidence."
This was not, strictly speaking, an obiter dictum, for it was necessary to the bringing out, in bold relief, the distinction on which the
case was ruled,. but it is entitled, for a better reason to be considered
aa authority-because it expresses the very mind of the law, as I
now proceed to show.
In lreakley vs. Bell, 9 W atts, 280, Judge Kennedy tells us, the
general rule seems to be, that if one indebted to another by simple
contract, give his creditor a promissory note, drawn by himself, for
the same amount, without any new consideration, the new note shall
not be deemed a satisfaction of the original debt, unless so intended
and accepted by the creditor. Hart vs. Boller, 15 S. & R. 162;
Roberts vs. Gallaher, 2 Wash. 0. 0. R. 191. "And most clearly
all the authorities go to show," added his Honor, "that at law,
accepting of a security of equal degree, either from the debtor himself, with or without a surety, or fr'om a stranger alone, at the
i:ns'anee of the debtor, is no extinguishment of the first debt, as
where a second bond is given to the obligee ; for one bond cannot
determine the duty of another." This was said in a case where the
attempt was made to make the note of a third party delivered by a
2ibtor to his creditor, payment of his own note, and the doctrine
laanounced, is decisive of the presant case, unless it can be shown,
i.hich it cannot, that bankers' checks are a superior security to
simple contract debts, and promissory nots.
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-But even a higher security for a debt given by different parties,
or for a different sum, will, in the absence of proof of the intention
.of the parties, be presumed to have been accepted as collateral
security, and not in satisfaction of the debt. Jones vs. Johnson,
3 W. & S. 276; Eby vs. Eby's A8signee8, 5 Barr, 440. So that it
would hot help the argument, 'if checks could be treated as higher
security than bills and notes.
In Tyson vs. Pollock, 1 Penrose & Watts, 876, two firms, Tyson
& Co., and Byrne & Co., joined in a written agreement, to purchase
of W. J.Pollock, a quantity of wheat, for which they were to pay
in the paper of certain specified banks. As the-wheat was delivered,
the two purchasing firms divided it between them, but instead of
paying in bank notes, each firm gave the creditor bills on Baltimore for their respective shares of the wheat. The bills of Tyson
& Co. were paid, but those of Byrne & Co. were protested, and this
was an action against Tyson & Co. on the original- contract, to
recover for the wheat had.by Byrne & Co. The plaintiffs recovered,
and in affirming the judgment, Ch. J.Gibson said--" In relation to
the partnership, each of the partner firms may be treated as a
stranger, capable of dealing with it in the character of debtor or
creditor; and as by the contract of sale, the wheat was to be paid
for in the notes of particular banks, the subsequent acceptance of
bills drawn by the partner firms, was payment in the bills of a
stranger of a precedent debt. On no other hypothesis could there
be the shadow of a defence; for, as one simple contract will not
merge in another, it has invariably been held that the debtor's own
bill or note for the price of goods sold, will nt extinguish the
briginal liability. Ld. Raymond, 1430; 2 Strange, 1218; Willes,
406. It merely operates as an extension of credit, and preventsp
recurrence to the original contract of sale before the bill or note
has come to maturity. 1 Esp. 8. We have then, payment of a
precedent debt in the bills of a third person, which has been universally held since Clark vs. Munden, 1 Salk. 124, not to be absolute
satisfaction, although it is otherwise where such payment has been
in pursuance of the original bargain. I feel no disposition to review
the authorities, but I may safely affirm, that no case can be found
in which any other doctrine was ever held. In h7ieely vs. Mande-
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ville, 6 Cranch, 264, the acceptance of a bill was barely held to be
a sufficient consideration for an agreement to discharge the precedent
debt." The strong confidence of the venerable chief justice, fully
justified by the general current of the authorities, was too strongly
expressed, in saying that no case can be found inconsistent with the
doctrine which has always prevailed in this court.
There are some Connecticut and Massachusetts cases which favor
the doctrine that a note or bill of exchange is payment of a precedent debt. Anderson vs. fUenshaw, 2 Day's R. 272; Thatcher vs.
-Dinsmore,5 Mass. R. 297. In Ellis vs. Wild, 6 Mass. 321, the
doctrine was carried to the extent of holding that forged notes were
p)ayment of goods sold. And possibly a stray case may be picked up
elsewhere, to stand as an exception to Judge Gibson's remark, but the
general tenor of the authorities in England and the United States,
is exactly that which he stated it to be.
Chief Justice Iolt, stated the law in these few words, in Ward
vs. Bi'ans, 2 Lord Raymond, 930 ; "taking a note for goods sold,
is payment, because it was part of the original contract, but paper
is no payment where there is a precedent debt. For when such a
note is given in p'tyment (that is for a precedent debt), it is always
intended to be taken under this condition, to be payment, if the
money be paid thereon in convenient time." See also Prectfordvs.
.Iixwell, 6 Term R. 52.
Taking a bill of exchange or promissory note, either of the
debtor or a third person, for a pre-existing debt, is no payment.
Toby vs. Barber, 5 Johns. 68; Herring vs. Sawyer, 3 Johns. Cases,
71. But where on the sale of goods, the bill or note, of a third
person is received by the seller, it is payment.
|rdhittech vs. Trankess, 11 Johns. R. 409. It is stated, said the Supreme Court of
New York, in Iays vs. Stine, 7 Hill, 130, thatacceptance of the
bill or note of a third person does not cancel a previous debt, unless
it is agreed to be received ii. absolute payment and satisfaction:
:b:1mlequent e ents may charge the creditor with the amount of the
i,:11 r note, as where he neg!..cts to make demand and gives notice
by Nhich the security of som'2 of the parties is lost, but the mere
ac'eptance of a bill has never been deemed to be a payment of a
previous debt.
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In the note of ilare & Wallace, to the case of Cumber vs: Wane,
1 Smith's Leading Cases, 5th Am. ed. p. 457, the result of the authorities on the point before us, is stated thus: the note or bill of a third
person-may'be given by'a debtor, and received by the creditor, as
collateral security-as conditional payment, that is, to be a satisfaction if and when paid-or as an ibsolute and immediate satisfaction
and discharge, and to be wholly at the risk of the creditor. Which
of these three it will be, depends entirely upon the intention of the
parties, to be derived from all the circumstances of the case. The
mere acceptance by the creditor of a negotiable note of a third
person makes it but collateral security. If the note be taken as
payment, that is ordinarily and prima facie, but conditional pay. ment. But the note will operate, as an immediate and absolute
satisfaction and discharge of the debt, -if such be the intention and
understanding of the parties, and such intention is to be implied where
the notes of a third person .are accepted in payment at the time
* the purchase is made, for it is to be understood as an exchange or
baiter, but where they are given for a pre-existing debt the pre-.
sumption is the other way, and nothing short of an actual agreement, or some evidence from which a positive inference of discharge
can be made, or proof of fraud, will suffice.
This is so clear and satisfactory : summary of the authorities,
both English and American, that I do not think it necessary to go
through them. I will add only a few others relating especially to
checks. Mr. Byles, in his work on Bills, at p. 17, says, if a creditor
in payment of any other debt than a bill or note, take a check, and
the banker fail, or the check be dishonored, the creditor's remedies
remain entire.
It is to be observed that he lays down the rule in general terms,
without taking a distinction between checks drawn by the debtor or
by a third party, and only paid out by the debtor. One of the
cases he cities, -Everett vs. Collins, 2 Campbell,-515, would have
justified such a distinction, for Lord Ellenborough does expressly
pit his judgment on the ground, that the check was drawn by the
agent of the debtor, but that was a case in which money was offered
to the creditor, and he insisted on taking a check. Still the debtor
was held liable on failure of the bank to pay the check, because it
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was regarded as the debtor's own check. The other cases cited
make no account of such distinction, and as .Everett vs. Collins
was only a Nisi Prius judgment, the learned author of the work on
the fullest effect
bills, did well to talke no notice of it. If h ierr,
were given to Lord Ellenborough's distiiti'n, it would merely
prove that the creditor, who insisted on taking th? c'ieck of a third
party instead of money, would be without recourse.
In another elementary book of great excellence, Addison on Contracts, p. 552, a new edition of which, edited by Edward Ingersoll
Esq., of the Philaelpihia Bar, has just appeared, the same rule is
laid down in regard to bankers' checks, and without noticing a distinction between those drawn by the debtor, and those of third
persons issued by him. If tlhc check is presented in due time and
refused payment, the loss will fall on the drawer, is this author's
mode of stating the rule.
It was said by Tilghman, Chief Justice, in Patten vs. Ash,, 7 S. &
R. 116, that a .naked check payable to one or bearr, is no evidence
C1 se of payment to the person whose name is inserted. It is
necesst'ry to pr-re that lie received the money. The same thing in
effert was said by Chief Justice Nelson, in the People vs. Baker,
20 Wcndell, 605. In the People vs. lowell, 4 Johnson R. 303,
the Tznguago of Chief Justice Kent, in respect to a check, was-"if
there was a pre-existent debt, for which it was given in payment,
the debt would still exist against the debtor, if the check was not
good. Unless a check be paid it is no payment.
Yhere a check on a bank is given, in the ordinary course of
business, it is not to be presumed to be received in absolute payinent of a debt, even if the drawer have funds in the bank, but as
the means whereby the holder may procure the money. The holder
becomes the agent of the drawer to collect the money; and if guilty
of no negligence in presenting the check for payment whereby an
actual injury is sustained by the drawer, lie will not be answerable
if from any peculiar circumstae'e- attending the bank, the check
v,,not paid ; but in a suit against the drawer for the consideration
the -hock, the holder may treat it as a nullity, and resort to his
,uhal cause of action. (;'onzwell ,k Wing vs. Lovett, 1 Hill's
.
N. Y. R. 51 afterward ali -'.led in Supru'ne Court.
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Such is the voice-of authority, in regard to the character of checks
as an instrument of payment. Distinctions are not taken between
payments in the debtor's checks, or those of a third person, because
no ground exists in reason for such a distinction. When this plaintiff applied to the defendants, for $200 of what they owed him, and
they gave him their own check for $132 94, and that of E. Bromfield & Brother, for $67,06, had they paid him one of these sums
any more than the other ? If their own check had not been paid,
it is admitted he would have recourse to them; their check was not
then, per se, payment. But they were well known to him, and he
had confidence in them, as is shown by leaving his money in their
hands. It does not appear that he knew Bromfield & Brother, or
had any reason to confide in them. Did he indeed take their check,
as higher security, than that of his chosen debtors ? Are we to
hold that the check of the defendants, was not payment, but that of
Bromfield & Brother, was? On what principle? No words were
spoken, or agreement made to create a difference. Both were mere
checks-of exactly the same grade and quality in law. If we are
to make implications from the circumstances of the parties, the
reasonable presumption would be that the plaintiff received the
check of the defendants, with more faith and confidence-with
stronger assurance that it would be paid-than the check of a party
unknown to him. It is more reasonable, to infer that he meant to
be their insurer, rather than the insurer of the other drawers. If
a distinction were to be made at all, between these instruments of
payment, it ought to be in favor of the one which is admitted not
to have been payment, and against the one that is claimed to have
been payment.
But there is no ground for such a distinction. None surely in
reason as applied to this transaction-none in authority, as I have
abundantly shown. The plaintiff received both checks, on the same
footing-as payment, if or when paid. With proper diligence, without the slightest imputed negligence, one of them proved uncollectable. And now on a question of payment between debtor and
creditor, that check can no more be considered payment than if it
had been drawn on the same bankers by the defendants themselves.
They are not liable as drawers, or endorsers, for they kept their
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name off of it, but they are liable on the original debt, for, to the
extent of this worthless paper issued by them, it remains unpaid.
There is no principle in our jurisprudence better settled or more
benign than that as between the original parties to a contract, equity
will relieve against a failure of consideration. If the defendants
had not had full value from the plaintiff, they would have claimed
relief. The most solemn contracts, even bonds and mortgages, do
not exclude inquiry into the consideration. How is this acceptance
of two checks, to be elevated so high as to be above inquiry or
relief' Is it indeed so that the law will relieve against failure of
c,)n.,iderati,)n in all cont-acts, except only when a creditor receives
from his debtor a check of a third party? A rule so absurd and so
unpi iciplel could have no other effect than to impair that confidence which is the very life of commercial transactions, and to
compel debtors to make their payments in the constitutional currency.
But it is said, the case stated makes the checks payment, and
that we must take the fact as if found in a special verdict. In the
narrative of the transaction the case stated speaks of the checks
being paid to the plaintiff, but there is not a word in it which implies
that he acknowledged them as satisfaction of his debt-or even
gave a receipt for them, or qualified the mere reception of them
by any express or peculiar terms. Had there been any thing of
this sort-a receipt in full if you please-the authorities cited show
it would have been only conditional payment, and other numerous
authorities which it were a shame to array in an opinion, prove that
all manner of receipts, even those upon deeds of conveyance, are
open to explana tion, and may be proved not to have been actual and
bona fide payments.
But of receipt, acknowledgment or agreement, there was nothing
-the mere acceptance of the checks was the only payment the
special verdict finds. Payment, but payment in checks. This is
what the case stated makes it. And this not by way of barter, but
payment in checks of a pre-existent debt, and this was conditional
:aymcnt-paynient when the checks were paid, or else the law
.neans not what it says.
The j:i.l::uint is reversed, and judgment is entered here on the
ase state-ik for 1,!aiutiff, for S'71 86 and costs.

SMEDLEY vs. CONAWAY.

In the Diotrict Court of Philadelpia.
SMEDLEY Vs. CONAWAY.

V.h'en (he p' anr a building is changed and greatly enlarged, while it is in the
ciurse oFeonstracion, the liens of mechanics and material-men subsequent to
.such ohange relate only to the commencement of the alteration on the ground,
and are subject to all liens which then had fastened on the land.

.

u the distribution of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale, a judgment in a scire facias
on a mechanic's claim is not prima facie evidence, in a contest with other lien
claimants.

Otterson and Guillou, for exceptants.
W. S. Price and -Valn contra.
. .The opinion of the court was delivered by
P. J.-The question which is presented upon these
exceptions is new, and the principle to be settled by its final dec3ion, of great importance. It must be confessed, also, that it is a
-question of no little difficulty. The Acts of Assembly in relation to
mechanics' liens, establish a system altogether out of the course of
the common law; and upon points, evidently not foreseen by the legislature and upon which the statutes have not spoken, the only grounds
of decision, to which we can resort, must be the general scope and
spirit of the enactments, the analogy of cases which have already
been settled, and such considerations of policy as may be supposed
to have had their influence on the minds of the law makers. We
are undoubtedly to aim at such results as will most effectually promote the interest and security of those classes of men, whom the
system was designed to favor.
The facts are, that Conaway was the owner of a large lot of
gro'und. On a part of this lot he commenced the erection of a building, intended as a manufactory for making saws by hand. After
he had commenced and before he had completed this building, he
determined to enlarge his plan so as to carry on-his business with
steam power. This change made necessary a number of additional
bu idings adjoining that first contemplated, and a very considerable
outlay of money. Accordingly an engine house, with a costly steam
engine, and other buildings, were then commenced and erected.
Before the original building was finished, though it would seem after
SHARSWOOD,
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he had entertained the design of enlargement, Conaway, who had
been carrying on the business of manufacturing saws by hand at
another place, moved into the premises. The mechanics' claims up
to this time were all discharged, and Conaway raised on mortgage
of the entire-lot, the sum of $2,175. No part of the intended improvements was then begun on the ground. Subsequently, however,
to their commencement, he raised other sums of money on mortgage,
and several judgments were entered against him. The mechanics
engaged in constructing the enlargement filed their claims against
the entire lot and buildings. The questions then are, whether their
claims are valid liens, and if they are, to what period of time do they
relate, the commencement of the first building, or the commencement, of what I shall term for convenience sake, the enlargement ?
As far as material to the determination of these questions, the
auditor reports as facts, and no issue having been demanded as to
these facts, we assume them to be correct, that when the first building was commenced, it was no part of the plan of the proprietor to
make this enlargement; there may have been in his mind a vague
hope or expectation, that at some future period, when his increase
of capital would enable him to do so, he would extend his establishment and introduce steam as the power by which to carry it on, nuc
there was nothing beyond this, except that the plan may have been
originally framed so that such an alteration might afterwards be
conveniently made. It is also reported as a fact, by the auditor,
that the change in question was a very material one-the character
of the design was different-and that when the Nhole was done, it
formed "an establishment in the same sense and effect as a mill,
the machinery of which is driven by one engine placed in a separate
house, and so that they would all pass by a deed under the description of a saw factory."
We are clearly of opinion that the claims of the mechanics employed upon the enlargement ought not to be held to relate to the
commencement of the original building. If they can, then the
mechanics and material men, who trusted to the credit of the first
structure, and based that credit, as tlwy well amght do, upon the
fae that it was a reasonable and moderate ent er rise, suited to the
C;.l,tal and resources of the owner would be obliged by a subsequent
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changd of -plan and'a wild scheme of expansion, to lose a large part
of their claims, and come in only pro rata with subsequent liens to
sn indefinite amount. There would be thus no limit to the power
of, the owner to involve them by subsequent changes of his plans.
The true point of view to regard this question, by which to test the
soundness of the principle .to be applied to it, is to consider it as
though it were a contest between xiechanics and material men who
had done their work and furnished their materials on the credit of
the first building, and those engaged on the subsequent enlargement
asking to be paid pro rata with them. The very foundation of the
lien given to the mechanic or material man is, that he trusts the
building. What building? That which is then in the course of
erection upon a certain plan, and with a certain design. It is to be
a dwelling house or a mill, a barn or a church. But if a man having-begun and nearly completed a dwelling house, should then
change his design, and determine to carky up the walls and make a
shot-tower of it, can it be said, in the eye of the mechanics' lien
law, that the shot-tower thus finished is the same building as that
begun, and that the first and last mechanics are all to come in
alike? A principle leading to resultsw which might prove so disastrous to the very class of men protected by this act, ought not to
be easily admitted. Nor would it be less dangerous to others.
The mortgagee in this case, when he advanced his money on the
first mortgage, examined the ground. He saw a building nearly
finished, which, when finished, would be a complete structure. He
took the precaution to inquire aiid satisfy himself that all the mechanics and material men, who up to that time had been employed
in that erection, were fully paid. Even if the proprietor had then
in his mind the idea of an enlargement, is the mortgagee to lose his
security entirely, by the commencement of extensive additions, the
expense of which will swallow up the whole value of the original
structure ? In the case before us, the cost of the engine and gearing
alone, included in the change, was more than $11,000, to say nothing
of the engine house and grinding shop. The true question then is,
was the whole establishment erected on substantially one plan and
design from the commencement, or was the plan or design so materially changed during the progress of the work as to make the
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whole a different building from that which was or would have been
erected had no such change taken place ? I use this language cautiously, to exclude the idea that any project of subsequent alteration,
whether vague or certain, whether entertained at the commencement
or sufrrested during the progress of the building, and not embodied
in the actual plan upon which it was commenced and carried on,
could make any difference. If-the change, whenever conceived or
whenever put in operation, involved the whole design and character
of the structure, if the whole when finishcd was substantially a different building from the one which was - first commenced, then
the existence of such a .esign ought no' injuriously to affect the
liens of the mechanics and others who trusted to the building according to the original plan.
But it follows not from this course of reasoning, that the mechanics
and material men employed about the enlargement have no lien
whatever upon the building when erected, nor that their liens may
not legitimately extend to the whole, from the time of the commencement of the enlargement, subject to the liens which had then already
attached to the original structure. We have the fact that the change
was a material one, altering the whole design, and that when complete, all together, both the original and the enlarged parts, constituted
one establishment. The enlargement would be worthless, comparatively, at least, if it were separated from the'main building, as much
so as a kitchen separated from a dwelling. Would this case be different, for better or worse, at least so far as the principle is concerned, if this enlargement had been commenced ten years after the
first building was finished, instead of a week before ? It is well
settled that when the whole design and character of an old building
are changed by alteration and improvements, it is to be considered
a new erection, within the acts of assembly relating to mechanics'
liens. The claims of the mechanics and material men relate to the
commencement of the alterations, and are subject to all prior liens,
which had fastened upon the land before that period.
It is, perhaps, not ea-.y to extract any clear rule of determination from the decided ezses, as to what alteration of an old buIding shall constitute a new erection within the provisions of the
statutes. It. cannot bt considered as definitely settled as yct, whe-
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ther the question is -one of law or fact. .We have heretofore decided, and as yet adhere to that decision, that when the facts are
ascertained or undisputed, it is for the court to determine what does
or does. not constitute new buildings. If it be a question of fact for
a jury, then there may be different verdicts in regard to the same
building by different juries, and some mechanics have their claims
allowed and others rejected, which would be the most palpable injustice. It is no more an indefinite question than are the questions
of reasonable notice and probable cause which have been finally resolved into questions of law for the sake of that certainty and uniformity which are always to be sought after in the administration of
justice.
In Hoover vs. Pennock, 5 Rawle, 307, Judge Kennedy said:
"Neither is it easy to conceive how a change made in the plan of
the house after it has been commenced, by enlarging or contracting
or in any other respect changing the plan of it, as long as the
original design of its character is retained, can with propriety be
said to change or give a new commencement to the building of it."
He evidently contemplates that there may be such an entire change
of plan as will give a new commencement to the work, and that is
when the original design of its character is changed. It may be
safely conceded that unimportant alterations in the plan, such as
the height or the number of the stories, the arrangement and finish
of the different rooms, or even the addition of one or more outhouses, not materially altering its character, would not affect the
rights of subsequent claimants. But it cannot be meant that there
must be a total change of purpose, as from a store to a dwelling.
The cases of Driesbachvs. Keller, and Armstrong vs. Ware, show
that it is not essential. In Driesbach vs. .Keller, 2 Barr, 79, there
was an old one-story dwelling, the roof was taken off, it was raised
one story, a new two-story house was built alongside of it, and the
whole put under a new roof. "Repairs," said Judge Sergeant,
"may be slight, or in some cases they may be very considerable, and
carried to such an extent as in fact to amount to the erection of a
new building, different in its capacities and character from the old
one. In extreme cases there can be no difficulty in determining in
which class to rank it, either as merely repairing or restoring an
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old building to its original state-, or as, in effect, constituting another
building. Even a slight addition, manifestly subservient to the
original edifice, might, perhaps, be merely a repair. But a substantial addition of material parts, a rebuilding upon another and
larger scale, constitutes a new building, even though some portions
of the old are perceived and incorporated in the new." Here was
a dwelling house, which, after the alteration, still continued to be a
dwelling house. Armstrong vs. Ware, 8 ITarris, 519, was the case
of a church which was enlarged, but still continued to be a church.
The intermediate case of Landes' Alpeal, 10, Barr, 379, it may be
difficult to distinguish ujon the facts from .Driesbach vs. Kheller,
yet the court do attempt to distinguish it, and do not profess to
overrule that case. It is clear that it is the extent and character of
the alteration, and not the mere change of the purpose of the building, which ought to make the difference. There are, doubtless,
cases in which it would be hard to say on which side of the dividing
line they are to be placed. The mere change of a common dwelling
into a store would not be as material an alteration as that of an ordinary single house into a large costly dwelling, with a double front
and extensive back buildings. A man builds a small weaver's shop
to weave by hand-looms. He enlarges it to ten times its original
size, and introduced power-looms. Ile may perhaps do so without
disturbing a single brick or rafter of the old structure. It was a
factory at first, it is still nothing but a factory, yet thde design of
its character,to use Judge Kennedy's phrase, has been as materially, nay, more materially changed than if it had been converted
into a store or dwelling. The cost of the alteration in its proportion to the whole, might be small in the latter case, in the former it
might be so great as to render the cost of the original structure
itself but a small proportion of.the whole.
We are satisfied that this principle in its application will do justice in this case. It would give priority to and serve the claims of
the mechanics for work done on the first building, if there had been
any such remaining unsatisfied. It gives priority to and secures
the mortgage executed and put on record before the alteration was
begun on the ground. As to the-subsequent mortgages and incum-
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brances, they have no equity against the intervening lien claimants,
the jury upon one of the issues submitted to them, having found
that the improvements were commenced on the ground before October 1, 1854. When these securities attached there was an enlargement of a very considerable nature actually in progress on the
premises. They were bound to take notice of it and of its character. The same notice they would be obliged to submit to in the
case of such an alteration of an old building as would constitute a
new erection. The liens for claims for work done and materials
furnished relate to the commencement of the alterations, not by the
formation of the plan in the mind of the owner, not by the making
of the contracts for the work, but by the work itself on the ground,
open, manifest, and therefore, notice to all the world.
We think the auditor was right in rejecting the claim of Hooven
and Ranckom. In a contest between mechanics and others for a
fund in court, a judgment recovered by the mechanic upon a sci. fa.
is as to the other claimants, res inter alios acta, and not even prima
facie evidence. As a judgment it ranks merely from its date. To
come in as a lien it must be proved so as to entitle it to relate to
the commencement of the building. If such judgments were even
prima facie evidence, honest mechanics might be defrauded with the
greatest ease by the owners when they become involved, confessing
judgments or allowing them to be entered against them, and it
would be utterly impossible for strangers to controvert them. The
exceptions of Hooven and Ranckom are dismissed. The other exceptions are sustained, and distribution is awarded according to
schedule B, annexed to the report, the alternation table of distribution, the amount payable to Charles Norris on his mortgage of
August 15, 1854, according to the principles of this opinion having
the preference, but as the fund is- sufficient to pay all the liens
allowed, and also the first mortgage and part of the second, it is
unnecessary to do more than decree distribution of the fund according to said schedule.
Exceptions of Hooven and Ranckom dismissed. The other exceptions sustained, and distribution of the fund in court decreed
according to schedule B, annexed to the auditor's report.

